The Battle for Syria

There ran down the edges of the desert a string of cities and their connecting road – Aleppo, Homs, Damascus….

As long as these cities remain in enemy hands, the seacoast (Lebanon and Israel) will not be secure.  But this isn’t a story taken from today’s age; so writes Hilaire Belloc in his book The Crusades: The World’s Debate, regarding the Holy Lands of Palestine.  It is curious to contemplate this perspective when considering more recent events.

The Crusades: Strategy

The Crusaders were concerned solely with the cities along the sea – Antioch, Tripoli, and Beirut, as examples – and, of course, the gem of Jerusalem.  They were so intent on these that they neglected and otherwise did not properly secure the cities inland – Aleppo, Homs, Damascus.  Had they done so, they would have divided the Moslem world; had they done so, Belloc believes they would have held the Christian Holy Lands – well, setting aside the fact that the invading lords intermarried (Christian Armenians were a popular choice) and otherwise accepted many of the local customs.

Fast-Forward

Before traversing 1000 years to current events, another stop or two might be considered. From Palestinians: The Making of a People, by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, describing the situation in the mid-nineteenth century:

Jerusalem’s merchants sent most of their trade (especially their locally produced soap and olive oil) through Damascus.

As trade will normally follow the most efficient route, it would seem the connection of Damascus with Jerusalem was natural – at least absent religious animosities (kept in reasonable check under much of the Ottoman period).

“Greater Syria” was viewed as (or hoped to be considered as) one by at least some Arabs at the time of the end of World War One:

Faysal meant today’s Syria and Lebanon, as well as Transjordan and Palestine.

Of course, in the end, the region was divided:

Syria would be put under French protection, and Palestine would remain with the British.  “The Arabs will not consent to that,” Husseini responded.

The time is the Great War, the issues are how the West might carve and divide the Middle East and how the locals might feel about this.  As during the time of the Crusades, the issue remains the line running from Aleppo to Damascus, running through Homs and Hama.  More on this from David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace:

Clayton…reported that al-Faruqi said Hussein would never allow France to have Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus.

Clayton and al-Faruqi recognized that France could not be excluded from the Christian coast of Syria-Lebanon (Hussein later insisted otherwise, specifically to include Beirut). But the Arabs indicated they would oppose “by force of arms” any French attempts to occupy the districts encompassed by this string of inland cities.

The towns had another important feature in common: they constituted the railroad line.

The French built the line some decades earlier.  Of course, a railroad line was of no consideration to the Crusaders; however the location of the railroad line supports the value of the corridor for transport and travel – bound by the mountains and difficult sea-coast to the west and the desert to the east.

In the end, the French retained authority over Greater Syria, to include what is today Syria and Lebanon – the inland cities as well as the coast beholden to these cities over the centuries.

Versailles carved Greater Syria into pieces: Transjordan was to become a (seemingly independent) Arab state; Palestine would go to the British, and Syria (to include Lebanon) would belong to the French.  From One Palestine, Complete, by Tom Segev:

But no one in Palestine was happy; the Arabs felt the country had been torn away from Syria; the Zionists were bitter because Transjordan had been torn away from Palestine, and the northern border differed significantly from the Zionists’ map.

It should be recognized that Syrian-Arab society included many of what Fromkin refers to as “secret societies.”  Each society had its own objectives and desired outcome.  Some wanted to remain under Ottoman rule – if they could not have independence, they preferred to be ruled by Moslems.  Also, they enjoyed the wealth generated by trade opportunities afforded by the Ottomans.

Other societies had their own purposes.  There was little that fully unified the disparate tribes and clans.

Today

Of course, to speak of an “Arab” position during the time spanning from the Crusades to Versailles is an exaggeration, a stretch.  This has changed in recent years, at least in Iraq, Libya, and Syria – albeit under the control of less-than-savory players.  Of course, it has reverted in two of the three – and the third (Syria) is under assault even now – hence, the focus of this post.

Assad must go, so we are told.  He (along with Hussein in Iraq and Ghaddafi in Libya) brought some semblance of unity within their respective states.  Yet, historically it was this disunity that proved to be a weakness for any unified Arab cause and a strength for any enemies.

Is this why Assad must go?  He represents a risk of presiding over a reasonably unified Arab state (as did Hussein and Ghaddafi elsewhere in the region)?

Assad must go, so we are told.  While rebels control much of eastern Syria – the desert – this critical western region of Syria (Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, the regions along the Beqaa) is still controlled, mostly, by Assad.

Is this why Assad must go?  Whoever controls Damascus will eventually control Jerusalem?

If successful, it will be rebels in control of Damascus and this critical region.  Perhaps it is enough to turn the entire region into a war zone, with Arab factions fighting amongst each other and not looking outside – such that Damascus cannot threaten Jerusalem for several generations.

Could this be what is behind “Assad must go”?

Perhaps.  At least according to Belloc.

Reprinted with permission from Bionic Mosquito.

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