Russia is in the Middle East to Halt the War
Frequent misconceptions surround the Russian role in the Middle East, and particularly its role in Syria. Many Syrians claim to see Russia attacking Israel or delivering to the Syrian government all its advanced weapons, technology and modern jets so these can be used against Israel’s continuous violation of its air space and invasion of its sovereignty. Actually, Syrians would like to see Russia bombing Israel or taking sides in the Iran (plus allies) – Israel conflict, and delivering the advanced anti-air missiles S-300 or even S-400 to Syria. Until today, all those with anti-Israeli feeling find Russia’s role (in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular) hard to understand. This goes for the nature of its relationship with Israel too, and even the US. We see accusations of “betrayal” launched against Russia and President Vladimir Putin
The time has come to shed some helpful light on the Russian role in the Middle East and look at the recent history of its involvement in the Levant.
Russia in Syria:
Until July 2015, Russia was providing weapons and spare parts to the Syrian Army. Many ships landed in the Syrian Mediterranean, where Russia maintained a naval base from the 1970s. Iran contributed generously to the payment of these shipments and Russia offered weapons at very low cost (half free and the other half paid), aware of its ally’s needs to face the Salafi Wahhabi Takferee in the Levant.
Actually, Russia believed, if the worse came to the worse, the Takferee of al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” (ISIS) would never be able to control Lattakia where the Russia naval base is situated, and that the central government of Damascus would be able to secure the capital, Homs and Hama, Zabadani and Lattakia provinces along with its (temporarily) allies in the “Axis of the Resistance”.
In July 2015 Iran and its allies decided to retreat from all rural areas into the main Syrian cities due to the impossibility of protecting the immense territories controlled by Jihadists. This is when Iran sent its special envoy in Syria, the head of the IRGC – Quds Brigade General Qassem Soleimani, to Moscow, who later was followed by Admiral Ali Shamkhani, to lay out the military situation and clarify the difficulties faced on the ground. Soleimani met more than once with the highest Russian authorities and explained that it may be too late to protect all of Lattakia from the jihadist rockets and missiles, and that the Russian base and warm water presence would definitely be in danger.
Iran and its allies were able to protect the capital Damascus, the road from the airport, the surrounding area of Sayyeda Zeinab, the borders between Lebanon and Syria from Talkalakh to Zabadani and Tartous. These kept a status quo for the central government and for the “Axis of the Resistance” to keep the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in place and the military support flowing from the airport and the Syrian harbour into Lebanon.
After long hesitation, Russia took the decision to send its Air Force to Syria in September 2015. Putin was not enthusiastic about declaring animosity to the US in what it had operationally designated as its own playground, the Middle East. The US had invested billions of dollars from its own and Saudi-Qatar’s money in Syria to change the regime.
US Special Forces and the CIA were running training programmes in Jordan, Qatar and Turkey for the same purpose. The UK invested, along with the US, tens of millions to train jihadists in fake propaganda and social media intelligence to attract the world’s public opinion in favour of “regime change” and portray a harsh camouflaged reality: “Even if we offer help to the jihadists of al-Qaeda, they are the lesser evil and Bashar al-Assad must be removed”. There was no strategy or plan to deal with an eventual failed state.
The world went along with this theory and mainstream media played its “dirty share”, drifting away from the essence of its duty and function to inform people about reality rather than take part in the conflict. The whole world was a victim of this biased mainstream media coverage based on an absence of reliable sources. The American doctrine and strategy of using regime change to “promote” peace is clearly counter-productive, and in fact promotes only one thing: American hegemony.
Putin didn’t feel ready to plunge into the Syrian quagmire. Too many countries were involved and the shadow of Afghanistan was still haunting the Russian leadership. However, the “unintended consequences” of the US policy towards Ukraine and its attempt, along with the European Community, to kick Russia out of the country and disrupt its huge economic income from gas selling into Europe was enough to make the Russian bear dive into the Levant.
Putin allocated more or less the existing Ministry of Defence yearly budget for training and weapons development to be invested in Syria. He seized the golden opportunity to move his chess game to make the US to understand that Russia is no longer weak and is capable of protecting its interests outside its territory or comfort zone. The Russian message to the US was clear: if you want to play in our Ukrainian garden Moscow will play in your Middle Eastern forest.
Russia moved to Syria not to win a war but to halt it, to prevent jihadists from having the upper hand and to protect its interests and those of its allies. Russia wanted to eliminate all Caucasian jihadists who joined ISIS and al-Qaeda to prevent these from travelling back home (or recruiting similar back home). It also wanted three more things: to ensure a long-term presence for its naval Mediterranean base in Tartous, for all parties to come to the political negotiation table, and for the US to stop the “regime change” goal. Russia also has in mind to exploit the very rich Syrian oil and gas and protect its gas supply line to Europe.
For Russia – unlike Iran – Assad was not an essential character to protect: it was the stability of the Syrian government that was paramount. Russia was ready to compromise (though Iran was totally against the removal of Assad and refused any compromise on this point) and ask Assad to go and choose another Alawite if that was the price of stopping the war. Moscow’s objective was not to defeat Washington on all grounds in Syria and there was therefore room for compromise and negotiation. Putin was apparently trying to imitate what Yasser Arafat said once: I hold the olive branch in one hand and the Ak-47 in another.
Moscow wanted the diplomacy channel to remain open with the Americans and was ready to play a “soft power” game but not to the point of alienating the US establishment. It was only when Turkey shot down a Russian jet at the end of 2015 that Russia understood how far the US was ready to go to face down Russia and bring its reputation to the ground. Putin refused to fall into the same US trap Leonid Brezhnev fell into when he sent the Soviet Army to Afghanistan in 1979.
This is when Putin ordered a harsh punitive financial (but not military) expedition against a NATO member, Turkey, knowing President Recep Tayib Erdogan was not alone in this challenge. What had happened that day was clear: it took 16 seconds for the Turkish Air Defence to fire at the Russian Sukhoi and shoot it down when the pilot approached the virtual borders between Syria and Turkey while bombing pro-Turkish jihadists in Kessab. Indeed, that was a very short time for the air defence high ranking officer base to go through the channels of authority, inform the head of the Turkish Air Force or the operational room at the Turkish MOD, then to the Chief of Staff, to the defence Minister and to President Erdogan. Turkey was waiting for the Russian jet with a finger on the trigger. Russia normally informs the Americans of all daily plans as part of the de-confliction agreement to avoid sky incidents since both Russia and the US operate in the same Syrian air space.
Russia re-established its commercial ties with Turkey after several months of interruption, when it was suitable for Russia and convenient for Erdogan who felt the US possible involvement in – or at least knowledge of – the coup d’état against him. This is when the American diplomacy moved in very fast. US Secretary of State John Kerry managed after months of negotiation to extract a deal with his Russia counterpart Sergei Lavrov to create demarcation lines between cities, keep a status quo on all fronts and ground the Syrian Air Force. All militants would keep control of territories they controlled. The same would have been valid for the Syrian Army. Russia would have been satisfied to halt the war as it was then.
Iran and Syria’s objectives were not identical to the Russians’ but met in many points. Tehran and Damascus were determined to liberate the entire Syrian territory. They were happy to see a superpower – Russia – stepping in Syria and facing another superpower, the US.
Iran could not handle the situation alone or even with its allies. The financial support, military training and hardware jihadists were receiving required the Iranian army to be involved. That was a possibility Tehran did explore if ever Russia refused to jump into the Syrian swamp. The cost would have been very high, much worse than the Iran-Iraq war. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates would have sent also troops to Syria, Qatar would have contributed financially, and a larger Middle Eastern war would have knocked at the Levant doors where Israel and the US would have gladly taken part in the show against Syria and Iran.
For Iran, the fall of Bashar al-Assad meant the fall of Iran itself and its Hezbollah strategic ally, and with it Iraq afterwards. Tehran was ready to gamble everything- and still is – to date. That was not Russia’s case. Russia‘s strategy is to keep a Syrian government in place and stop jihadists from having the upper hand at all cost.
It was only when the Pentagon disagreed with Kerry to go along with Russia and halt the war in Syria that Moscow decided to continue fighting and liberate Aleppo. Russia knows that its air force can do very little without a solid, well trained and motivated ground force to recover territory. Jihadists learned how to protect themselves from air attacks when barricaded in cities. This is where Hezbollah and the Elite Syrian Tiger forces came in, along with other competent Syrian army troops. Russia understood it was not alone in the war and logically could not have the ultimate decision in everything.
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